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Abstract  
The U.S. Navy is developing new maritime strategies and command structures to guide 
transformation efforts, to ensure the security of the global maritime commons in the new 
network-centric era, and to fit the challenges of the 21st century. The addition of an 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) commander is one such innovative 
structural innovation that is under consideration. To empirically investigate different 
conceptualizations of ISR officers, we contrasted an ISR officer who coordinated--but did 
not own—ISR assets with an officer that coordinated—and owned—all ISR assets under 
low and high intensity mission conditions. Four teams comprised of three active duty 
officers were assigned to coordination or command ISR conditions and participated in 
two 90 minute experimental sessions using the Distributed Dynamic Decision-making 
simulator. The findings show that when task intensity was high the percentage of tasks 
correctly processed was higher when the ISR officer was a commander than a 
coordinator. We also found attack accuracy to be higher and action latency lower when 
mission intensity was high and the ISR officer was a commander. Implications for 
command and control organizations are discussed.  
Introduction 
Organizational design and related strategies are undergoing dramatic changes in form and 
function within the U.S. military. The creation of Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) is 
one example of the transformational vision provided in the Naval Operating Concept 
(2002) where Strike Groups offer the potential to revolutionize naval warfare in the 
littoral region. The ESG provides a flexible force package, capable of tailoring itself to 
accomplish a wide variety of missions.  
ESGs present a new way of organizing Navy and Marine Corps assets and personnel to 
accomplish a broad range of missions. A joint Navy and Marine Corps Naval Operating 
Concept (2003) describes a transformational vision for the future employment of U.S. 
Naval forces, which includes the development of ESG, Carrier Strike Group (CSG), and 
Expeditionary Strike Force (ESF) organizational constructs (Callahan, 2005). Operational 
deployment of these newly formed units began in 2003. This realignment of naval assets 
under the Strike Group concept provides the Amphibious Squadron/Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (PHIBRON/MEU) with significantly more offensive and defensive 
capability. ESGs have recently undergone proof of concept testing in which they were 
deployed under different command arrangements to test and validate various command 
and control (C2) constructs for organization. 
We are particularly interested in investigating how ESGs with alternative structures and 
processes are able to perform their mission tasks. For this effort we focus on the 
incorporation of an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) officer and how 
the definition of that position can impact performance and information flow in an 
information rich planning and execution environment. Specifically, the issues we 
investigated involved the C2 responsibilities of the ISR officer in terms of resource 
allocation, coordination efficiency, and performance/execution of the mission. 
Observations and analyses reported by Weil et al. (2006) underscore the Navy’s interest 
in the role of an ISR officer and the effect such a position would have on the ESG’s 
performance effectiveness. Based on these observations it seems that the inclusion of an 
ISR officer would be beneficial to an ESG as such an organization strives to perform the 
myriad of tasks comprising its mission. The question is how the ISR position should be 
defined and empowered.  
A study reported by Baker et al. (2004) manipulated the presence and absence of an ISR 
coordinator with two other independent variables, information load (low, high) and time. 
The ISR coordinator was conceptualized as a new command position that would 
coordinate all theater sensors and maintain situational awareness for the organization. 
The researchers, drawing on modeling results that indicated a 25% increase in mission 
performance when an ISR coordinator was present (Serfaty et al., 2002), hypothesized 
that an organizational structure that included an ISR coordinator would perform at a 
higher level—particularly when information load was high—than an organizational 
structure that did not include an ISR coordinator. Results did not appear to support this 
hypothesis. Despite the lack of performance results, however, during periods of high 
information load, teams with an ISR coordinator processed more critical 
email/intelligence messages and demonstrated a better understanding of message 
criticality. This indicates superior situational awareness. Results also revealed that teams 
with an ISR coordinator exhibited a steeper improvement in performance over time 
compared to teams without an ISR coordinator. By the end of the study, teams with an 
ISR coordinator caught up to the performance of the teams without an ISR coordinator in 
both low and high information load conditions. This led the researchers to speculate that 
the presence of an ISR coordinator may facilitate performance improvements and with 
more experience and practice teams with an ISR coordinator would surpass the 
performance of the teams without an ISR coordinator.  
The Baker et al. (2004) study provides some support for the inclusion of an ISR officer as 
part of the Navy’s Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) organization. Although Baker 
et al. refer to the ISR officer in their study as a coordinator, in fact the ISR officer was 
defined and empowered as a commander and owned the primary theater ISR assets. 
Alternatively, the ISR officer could be defined as a true coordinator and empowered to 
facilitate information gathering and flow within the ESG organization without actually 
owning the ISR assets. The use of coordinators within naval organizations or command 
and control in general is not without precedence (see Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 1994; 
Allard, 1996). Generally speaking coordinators are seen as facilitators that can increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of an organization by specializing in some specific area 
or across specified areas and maintaining high situational awareness.  
This paper focuses on empirically investigating the differences between an ISR 
coordinator’s and an ISR commander’s impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of a 
command and control organization. Based on the effectiveness of commanders within the 
CWC doctrine, we hypothesize that an ISR commander will be generally more effective 
in fostering efficiency and effectiveness within a command and control organization than 
an ISR coordinator. From another aspect of the Baker et al. (2004) study we also 
hypothesize that the ISR commander will be particularly superior in performance to the 
ISR coordinator when workload in terms of mission tasks is higher than lower. 
Method 
Participants 
The 14 participants for this experiment were active duty military officers drawn from 
classes at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Although the Naval 
Postgraduate School draws from all services, the participants in this study were 
predominately naval officers and ranged in rank from 01 to 03. The participants were 
organized into four teams of 3-persons and one team of 2-persons.  
Independent Variables and Experimental Design 
The primary experimental condition was the responsibilities and authority of ISR position 
at two levels and a control condition. The self-synchronized condition (Level 1), 
conducted only as a control, had no single person responsible for coordination of ISR 
assets—the responsibility for ISR coordination was diffused over two participants. At 
Level 2 an ISR Coordinator was responsible for pushing/pulling information among the 
participants and for coordinating use of ISR assets based on the Commander’s Intent. 
Level 3 involved an ISR Commander, who had the same responsibilities as the ISR 
Coordinator plus “owned” all the unmanned air vehicles (UAVs; a primary theater ISR 
asset). This independent variable was manipulated as between-subjects. One team of two 
participants was assigned to the self-synchronized condition as a control—the two 
participants decided amongst themselves how best to employ the scarce ISR resources. 
Two teams were allocated to the ISR Coordinator condition and the participant 
designated as the ISR coordinator managed asset usage by managing the information 
flow between all players but did not own/control ISR assets. Lastly, two teams were 
assigned to the ISR commander condition and the participant designated as the ISR 
commander in addition to managing the flow of information and directing use of ISR 
assets, owned the primary ISR assets that were allocate on a case by case basis. For a 
more detailed discussion of this independent variable, as well as other method-related 
topics, we recommend the reader see Hutchins et al. (2007). 
The second independent variable was mission or task intensity manipulated over two 
levels: low and high. Drawing on Baker et al. (2004) and Entin, Entin, & Hess (2000) two 
scenario intensity conditions were derived manipulating mission workload in terms of 
tasks per unit time. The high intensity task condition presented 50% more tasks to be 
completed than the low intensity condition. Due to scheduling and resource constraints it 
was not possible to counter-balance the two task intensity conditions. Thus, all teams 
experienced the low intensity condition followed by the high intensity condition as a 
within-subjects variable. 
The three levels of the between-subjects ISR type independent variable were crossed with 
the two levels of task intensity to produce a mixed-design of six experimental conditions 
illustrated in Table 1. 
Table 1: Number of Groups in Each Experimental Condition 
  Workload (Within-Subjects) 
  Low Intensity High Intensity 
Self-Synchronized 1 1 
ISR Coordinator 2 2 
ISR Position 
(Between-
Subjects) ISR Commander 2 2 
 
Dependent Variables 
Three types of dependent variables were derived from the simulation environment. All of 
the dependent variables related to tasks completed by the mission teams. Tasks varied on 
the number of information attributes required to be discovered before action could be 
taken. For example, a fishing boat could have a hostility attribute (e.g., hostile/not 
hostile) and a weapons attribute (e.g., weapons/no weapons). Participants could discover 
attribute values by employing ISR assets. About a third of the tasks required no attributes 
to be measured, another third required one attribute to be measured, and the last third 
required two attributes to be measured. Once the attribute values were determined, 
participants had to make a decision regarding processing of that task. Some attribute 
combinations required further processing (e.g., if a fishing boat is hostile and has 
weapons, a “Vessel Board, Search, & Seizure” was to be performed), while other 
attribute combinations required no further action (e.g., if a fishing boat was not hostile 
and had no weapons). Participants were given clear instructions regarding the proper 
action to take given different attribute value combinations. Given these constraints, three 
dependent measures were examined. 
1. The percentage of tasks a team correctly attacked (that is, tasks in which the team 
took action only when task attributes warranted action). Two types of errors 
eroded the percentage of tasks correctly attacked, (1) failure to attack a task in 
which attribute values required an attack and (2) attacking a task that did not have 
the attribute values to require an attack. 
2. The percentage of tasks that were attacked with correct resources (attack accuracy 
– bringing the correct type of resources to bear).  
3. The latency, or reaction time in seconds, related to four activities. Detection 
latency measured the length of time between the instant a task appeared on the 
simulation screen and the time it was detected by the participants. First 
measurement latency assessed the length of time from task detection until the first 
attribute measurement. Second measurement latency calculated the time between 
the first measurement and the second measurement, if the task required a second 
measurement. The final latency variable referred to as attack latency measured the 
length of time from the last attribute measurement until the task was attacked.  
Scenario 
The scenario illustrated a humanitarian effort and included tasks indicative of the ESG 
mission set. Teams working in the Dynamic Distributed Decision-making (DDD; 
Kleinman and Serfaty, 1989) simulation environment were required to perform a variety 
of mission tasks. These tasks included surveillance of fishing boats and fishing villages 
for refugees, terrorists, and/or weapons. Tasks also included vessel boarding, aiding 
refugees, or performing rescues. The scenario was designed to create tension over the use 
of ISR assets because of limited supply, time pressure, or task difficulty. Conflicts over 
the use of ISR assets forced choices to be made regarding allocation of resources. This, in 
turn, encouraged communication among participants and motivated the need for 
adjudication by the ISR officer. 
The scenario narrative began with a description of a situation in which a tsunami had 
negatively affected life in a region that included both countries friendly and unfriendly to 
the United States. The participants were instructed to provide security, logistical support, 
humanitarian aid, and security to in-land refugees, littoral force protection, and open sea 
anti-piracy operations. These tasks required teams to constantly monitor fishing villages 
and small boats with ISR assets and to quickly react to unexpected events.  
Procedure 
All teams participated in two training periods. The first lasted for two hours and the 
second for an hour and a half. During training, participants received instruction on how to 
use the DDD simulation and how to function as a team performing mission tasks.  
Prior to the training all participants were given a “read ahead” packaged that described 
the background leading up to the current humanitarian mission, the assets that Blue forces 
possessed, the commander’s intent, the rules of engagement, and intelligence describing 
more of the current picture. Following training, each team received a short brief about the 
mission, was afforded some time to plan, and then completed the first of two 90 minute 
data collection sessions.  
Results 
The means for the percentage of tasks correctly attacked are depicted in Figure 1. There 
was no main effect for experimental condition, but the significant main effect for task 
intensity revealed that all conditions attained a higher percentage of correct attacks in the 
low (mean = 91.61%) verses the high (mean = 89.22%) intensity treatment, F(1, 2) = 
153.69, p < .007. As expected, the higher task intensity imposed a higher workload that 
eroded performance. The ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between 
experimental condition and task intensity, F(2, 2) = 22.58, p < .05. As we can see from 
Figure 1, the self-synchronized control performed about the same as the ISR coordinator 
condition, thus in keeping with the primary thrust of this research we performed an a 
priori planned comparison that focused on the differences between the ISR coordinator 
and ISR commander conditions. We performed a second ANOVA, similar to a simple 
effects analysis, omitting the self-synchronized condition. The implication of the self-
synchronized control condition’s outcome and its relationship to the other experimental 
levels is addressed in the Discussion Section below. This second analysis showed that 
while the performance of the two ISR conditions was about the same when task intensity 
was low, the ISR commander achieved a higher percentage of correct attacks than the 
ISR coordinator condition when task intensity was high, F(1, 2) = 13.88, p < .07. Having 























Figure 1. Percentage of Tasks Correctly Processed (Correctly Attacked) by Experimental 
Condition and Task Intensity 
 
Percent attack accuracy is the next dependent measure analyzed and the means for this 
analysis are shown in Figure 2. For this analysis the factors were experimental condition, 
task intensity, and task attributes with the latter two factors analyzed as within-subjects 
variables. A significant three-way interaction was revealed by the ANOVA, F(4, 2) = 
209.14, p < .01. Inspection of the means showed that the self-synchronized control 
condition means were again similar to one of the ISR condition, thus we computed an a 
priori planned comparison in the form of an ANOVA omitting the self-synchronized 
condition to sharpen the focus on the two ISR conditions. Once again the three-way 
interaction proved significant, F(2, 2) = 165.29, p < .01. From Figure 2 we see that the 
patterns of results for the zero-attribute and one-attribute tasks are quite similar and 
different from the results for the two-attribute tasks. For the zero-attribute and one-
attribute tasks both ISR conditions have higher percent attack accuracy in the high than 
low task intensity treatment, whereas, for two-attribute tasks the ISR coordinator attained 
higher percent attack accuracy in the low intensity treatment and ISR commander achieve 
perfect attack accuracy in both task intensity treatments. Once again there appears to be 
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Figure 2. Percent Attack Accuracy by Experimental Condition and Task Intensity for 
Zero, One, and Two Attribute Tasks 
 
Analyses of the four latency variables for tasks with either zero attributes to measure or 
one attribute revealed no reliable differences. Thus, only tasks requiring two attributes to 
be measured are discussed. The means for detection latency can be found in Figure 3. A 
main effect for intensity indicates that latency was shorter when task intensity was high 
rather than low, F(1, 2) = 343.43, p < .005, most likely due to the higher density of tasks 
in the high intensity treatment. The interaction between experimental condition and 
intensity was also significant, F(2, 2) = 64.55, p < .02. To focus specifically on the two 
ISR officer types, an a priori planned comparison ANOVA was computed with the self-
synchronized experimental condition omitted. The interaction still proved to be 
significant, F(1, 2) = 96.62, p < .02. Perusing the means in Figure 3, we can see that the 
ISR coordinator was almost four times faster detecting the task than the ISR commander 
when task intensity was low, but only 1.6 times faster when task intensity was high. 


























Figure 3. Detection Latency as a Function of Experimental Condition and Task Intensity 
for Tasks Requiring Two Attribute Assessments 
 
The means for first measurement latency in Figure 4 show that reaction time still tends to 
be shorter when task intensity is high than low, F(1, 2) = 15.51, p < .06. There is no 
significant interaction or a significant main effect for experimental condition—the 
latencies for the two types of ISR officers are not reliably different when it comes to 



























Figure 4. First Measurement Latency as a Function of Experimental Condition and Task 
Intensity for Tasks Requiring Two Attribute Assessments 
 
The means for the second measurement latency can be found in Figure 5. The interaction 
between experimental condition and intensity is significant, F(2, 2) = 19.99, p < .05. As 
before we computed an a priori planned comparison dropping the self-synchronized 
condition to allow us to concentrate on the two ISR conditions. The recomputed ANOVA 
reveals a main effect for intensity, F(1, 2) = 20.47, p < .05 indicating high intensity (mean 
= 369 sec.) produced longer latencies than low intensity (mean = 190 sec.). The mean 
latency for the ISR commander condition (mean = 191 sec.) was significantly shorter 
than the latency for the ISR coordinator condition (mean = 369 sec.), F(1, 2) = 93.49, p < 
.02. Most telling, however, was the significant interaction, F(1, 2) = 34.14, p < .03 
(Figure 5). The ISR coordinator produced exceptionally longer latencies than the ISR 
commander when task intensity was high. When task intensity was low the latencies of 
the two ISR conditions was about the same. Not having control over critical ISR 
resources when task intensity is high and the tasks to be dealt with require two 

























Figure 5. Second Measurement Latency as a Function of Experimental Condition and 
Task Intensity for Tasks Requiring Two Attribute Assessments 
 
Inspection of the means for attack latency, calculated as the time between the last 
attribute measure and the attack, showed no significant main effects or interactions. One 
final overall analysis looking collectively across the four latency variables revealed that 
the ISR commander tended to have a shorter reaction time than the ISR coordinator when 
latencies were averaged over the two task intensities, F(1, 2) = 14.12, p < .065. These 
























Figure 6. Overall Reaction Time for the ISR Coordinator and Commander Conditions 
across the Three Latency Variables and Task Intensity 
Discussion 
The inclusion of an ISR officer in the ESG organization—in one fashion or another—is 
currently being considered by the Navy. Observations from ESG-1 missions, modeling 
results (see e.g., Serfaty et al., 2002), and the promise that the ISR picture will only get 
more complex (Callahan, 2005) have all but convinced the Navy that ISR management 
cannot be left in its current state.  The issues on which this study focused were the 
definition and authority of that ISR position. We addressed these by contrasting two ISR 
officer positions, the first a coordinator who facilitated information flow within the 
organization, but did not own any ISR assets and the second a commander who facilitated 
information flow and also owned critical theater ISR assets. Based on previous literature 
and observations made within an ESG organization, we hypothesized that the ISR 
commander would foster more efficient and effective performance than the ISR 
coordinator doing ESG-like mission tasks. The results from this study lend support to this 
hypothesis. We also argued that the ISR commander condition would be superior to the 
ISR coordinator condition particularly when task intensity, in terms of the number of 
tasks to be done, was high. There was support for this hypothesis as well.  
The function of the self-synchronized control was to serve as a benchmark, a way to 
observe whether the outcomes of the two ISR conditions were within realistic bounds.  
We therefore expected that the self-synchronized control outcomes would be similar to 
one or the other ISR conditions, which they were, but never significantly different from 
both of them.  This was substantiated; the self-synchronized control was never 
significantly different from both ISR conditions.  Moreover, in concert with the Navy’s 
interests, the design and scenario of this study were optimized to reveal differences 
between the ISR coordinator and ISR commander conditions.  As such we never intended 
to contrast the self-synchronized control with either of the two ISR conditions.  With 
adjustments in the design and scenario, a self-synchronized condition could be contrasted 
with the two ISR conditions.   
Examining the results for the percentage of tasks attacked correctly, we observed that it 
was when intensity was high that the ISR commander condition was superior to the ISR 
coordinator condition. When intensity was low the performance of the two ISR 
conditions was not different. The results also showed that, in general, the higher 
workload conditions of the high intensity treatment are detrimental to performance. So it 
is particularly significant that ISR commanders performed better than the ISR 
coordinators in the high intensity condition. We suspect that owning an important ISR 
theater asset enabled the ISR commanders to obtain information needed to decide if and 
how to process a task. This is a key finding because it implies that owning the ISR assets 
needed to perform a mission task reduces coordination overhead, thus allowing more 
attention to be allocated to do the task correctly. These results dovetail nicely with the 
attention allocation literature (see Wickens, 1996).  
Results from the analysis of percent attack accuracy also lends support to the hypothesis 
that ISR commanders’ performance will be better than ISR coordinators’ under higher 
workload conditions. In fact, the ISR commanders’ performances proved to be perfect for 
the high task intensity treatments and when tasks required two attribute assessments. 
When the tasks required zero or one attributes to be assessed, the ISR commanders did 
well: better in the high than low task intensity treatments, but not better than the ISR 
coordinators. The real advantage of controlling one’s own ISR assets appears to come 
when many tasks have to be attended to and multiple attributes must be assessed to learn 
how a task is to be attacked. Controlling at least one of the needed ISR assets lowers the 
coordination overhead. A lower coordination overhead probably does not matter much 
when workload and task demands are manageable. But when workload or task demands 
or both are high, a lowered coordination overhead could be the difference between having 
sufficient attention resources to allocate to correct task execution and not having 
sufficient attention resources and poor task execution. 
Examining the latency results we see that although ISR commanders tended to have 
shorter latencies overall, this was not true for certain latency conditions. ISR coordinators 
exhibited faster reaction times for detection and for performing the first measurement. 
Owning/controlling one’s own ISR assets does not appear to speed up reaction time when 
detecting a task or assessing the first attribute of a task. These finding make sense and fit 
with our argument of coordination overhead - there is not much coordination overhead to 
manage when detecting or making a single attribute assessment. Adding two attribute 
assessments, each perhaps requiring a different ISR asset, plus high workload and the 
advantage to the lower coordination overhead afforded the ISR commander becomes 
apparent in reaction time. 
Our study contrasted an ISR coordinator conceptualized as one who facilitates 
information flow, but does not own/control ISR assets, to an ISR commander 
operationally defined as one who facilities information flow and owns/controls an 
important ISR theater asset. The findings show that when workload and task demands are 
high the ISR commander performs at a higher level and exhibits shorter latencies than the 
ISR coordinator. We offer lower coordination overhead for the ISR commander as an 
explanatory mechanism. There are, however, some caveats and cautions that accompany 
our results. Although we used active duty officers in our study to increase operational 
relevance, our results rest upon a small number of teams. We also acknowledge that in 
addition to replication with more teams, we need to more richly define the position of our 
ISR officers and provide more operationally complex mission tasks to produce more 
robust findings. Thus, as usual, we call for more systematic observations under controlled 
experimental conditions. 
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